allows physicians and researchers to have more comprehensive data for clinical decision making and research. However, due to valid data privacy concerns, health entities may be reluctant to exchange identifiers.
Creating a collection of patient-level records with geographically distributed and longitudinal data from multiple entities that can be used for research is a significant challenge. In recent years the importance of this problem has been realized, resulting in innovative solutions. However, existing methods still suffer from security challenges. For example, Kho et al. 4 proposed a seeded hashing on predetermined fields. Essentially, all parties convert the record fields used for linkage into corresponding random-looking strings that are then matched by a central party. This provides protection against external attackers, since the random-looking strings cannot be easily reversed into the actual record values.
However, such solutions that rely on a third party (an honest broker) are often not secure. 5, 6 If the trusted third party has access to hash data and the shared encryption key, the hashed value of the linkage variables will be susceptible to different types of attacks (e.g., a dictionary attack or frequency analysis), especially if the domain of the information is small or well-known. 7 To address this issue, alternative methods using a semitrusted third party 8 or commutative encryption 9 have also been proposed, but they still make weaker security assumptions. For example, the approach of Durham et al. 10 uses Bloom filters and is robust to some well-known attacks on Bloom filters such as frequency-based cryptanalysis, but a third party is often required for coordinating field weight and linkage. The approach of Vatsalan and Christen 11 does not rely on a third party, but the framework requires optimizing some critical parameters, which are difficult in practice. Yakout et al. 12 propose a two-step linkage method that does not rely on a third party; however, some privacy may be leaked during the first step, which is used to get the approximate linkage.
In this work, we propose a completely secure deterministic record linkage method for two parties. Our method guarantees that no extra information is revealed to the two parties beyond the results of the matching, and no information is revealed to any other party (with an 80-bit security level). We provide a basic approach based on a classical implementation of garbled circuits (GCs) and a computationally more efficient approach using a filtering strategy. Unlike methods requiring honest-broker intermediaries, our approach does not require an external third party. The significance of this work is that it provides a proof of concept for secure two-party record linkage using state-of-the-art GC methods that can be readily adopted in small-to medium-scale linkage tasks with a strong security guarantee.
Adversary Model. We assume that the parties want to collaborate and will adhere to terms of use. This "honest but curious" model assumes that one of the parties may inspect (or be unintentionally exposed to) private data, while carrying out agreed-upon algorithms faithfully; i.e., parties are semi-honest, which is typical in healthcare settings. Individuals in this scenario should be protected from accidental exposure to protected health information. On the other hand, if trust levels are low or data are posted publicly, the assumption that both parties are malicious may be required to obtain the desired levels of security. Our work can be extended to such settings too, although with much greater computational cost.
RELATED METHODS
We follow the deterministic approach followed by Kho et al., 4 which has been shown to perform well in terms of both accuracy and efficiency with real data from six institutions in the Chicago metropolitan area. Kho's method proceeds as follows. For two records (A and B) from different sites, the following four match criteria are used (SSN stands for Social Security Number):
• Seeded HashID of (First Name + Last Name + Date of Birth), • Seeded HashID of (Date of Birth + SSN), • Seeded HashID of (Last Name + SSN), or • Seeded HashID of (Three Letters First Name + Three Letters Last Name + Soundex 13 First Name + Soundex Last Name + Date of Birth + SSN).
For flexibility, each criterion is assigned a weight (Kho et Here, T is the given threshold (set to 1 by Kho et al. 4 ). Note that in the actual implementation, the comparison of the rule outputs is done by an independent third party, with the seeded HashID providing security, except in the case of collusion.
GARBLED CIRCUITS

GC
14 is a cryptographic technique that enables the computation of a function where the inputs are held by two different parties in a completely secure manner. It is a general technique that can be used to compute any function representable in the form of a circuit. Although restricted to two parties, it supports a rich class of operations.
The basic idea is to represent the function to be computed as a basic logic circuit, which is then interactively computed by the two parties. One party creates a GC corresponding to the original circuit, taking into account all of the potential inputs of the other party, while the other party evaluates this GC using its actual input. Thus, the first party plays the role of the (circuit) generator, while the second plays the role of the (circuit) evaluator. Essentially, the generator designs a GC to compute the required function while encoding its input into the circuit itself. This is then sent to the evaluator, which first retrieves the evaluation key (garbled input) corresponding to its actual input from the generator and then evaluates the circuit using the retrieved keys. Figure 1 depicts this process. Without loss of generality, we assume that Site 1 plays the role of the generator, while Site 2 plays the role of the evaluator. We now explain this in more detail. To securely compute a function f(X, Y), where X is the input from the generator and Y is the input from the evaluator, the generator will first translate the function f(X, Y) into a Boolean circuit, which is composed of basic Boolean gates (e.g., AND, OR, or XOR). For each input and output of each gate, the generator creates a pair of keys (garbled inputs), one to be used if the value of the I/O is 1 and the other to be used if the value of the I/O is 0. Now, given the truth table (I/O relationship) for each gate, the generator creates a garbled truth table by using the appropriate input keys to encrypt the corresponding output key as per the truth table. This truth table is called garbled since it contains only encryptions for the output, which cannot be used to determine the input. The generator can send all of the garbled truth tables along with its garbled inputs to the evaluator.
However, the evaluator still needs to get the key (garbled input) corresponding to its actual input, without telling the generator what the input is. This can be done using a standard cryptographic primitive known as oblivious transfer (OT), 15 which allows a party (in this case, the evaluator) to retrieve a single message (the corresponding key) from the other party (the generator) without revealing anything to the generator. Once the evaluator has retrieved its garbled inputs, it can then evaluate the circuit. Figure 2b shows the garbled inputs (keys) that are created by the generator for the XOR gate. As can be seen from its truth table (in Figure 2c) , the XOR gate returns the correct output based on the comparison of its single-bit inputs. Figure  2d gives the corresponding garbled truth table created. Each row is simply the appropriate encryption of the corresponding output key. For example, if X and Y were both 0, since the actual output should be 0, the corresponding row of the garbled truth table would contain the output key corresponding to 0 (kz0) encrypted by the keys corresponding to its input (kx0 and ky0). Note that in actuality the rows of the garbled truth table are permuted to ensure that the evaluator cannot identify what inputs correspond to each row. Now, as mentioned above, the generator transfers the garbled truth tables for all of the gates in the circuit to the evaluator, along with the generator's garbled input (the keys corresponding to its input). For example, when the generator's input (X) is 1, it sends the key kx1 to the evaluator. Note that since the keys kx0 and kx1 cannot be distinguished, the evaluator cannot figure out what the generator's input is from the key it sees. The evaluator then retrieves its garbled input using OT. Suppose the evaluator's input (Y) is 0. Then, the evaluator will obliviously retrieve the key ky0 from the generator. Now, the evaluator uses the garbled inputs (keys) corresponding to the inputs of both the generator and the evaluator to evaluate the circuit. This is done by decrypting each row of the garbled truth table. Note that only one row will be correctly decrypted, giving the key corresponding to the correct output, even though the evaluator does not know what the output is. Thus, in our example only the row corresponding to keys kx1 and ky0 is decrypted, giving the key kz1. This continues for all of the gates, with the outputs of the corresponding steps used to decode the following garbled truth tables until the evaluator receives the final output of the circuit. For the final gate, the generator also tells the evaluator what bits the output keys correspond to.
Thus, for our simple inequality circuit above, the generator tells the evaluator that kz0 corresponds to 0 and that kz1 corresponds to 1. With this information, the evaluator can now figure out the answer of the circuit. Thus, in the example above, since the evaluator receives kz1, it can figure out that the output of f(X, Y) = 1. The detailed proof of security can be found in the manuscript by Yao. 14 While this approach works only for the honest-but-curious model, there are refinements that allow it to work for the malicious model too.
METHODS
We implemented and tested the GC approach (the software can be found at https://github.com/achenfengb/RecordLinkage.git) by building a multibit circuit that encodes all of the four match criteria checked by Kho et al. There is no need to compute the seeded HashID since no data is externally visible. For each matching rule, we convert the required fields into sufficiently long bit strings, concatenate them, and build a corresponding bit length comparator circuit for matching.
For example, the first rule checks if the combination of first name, last name, and date of birth is the same. The first name is encoded using 96 bits (sufficient for any name under 12 ASCII characters). The last name is encoded using 88 bits (sufficient for any name with up to 11 characters). The date of birth is encoded using 64 bits (sufficient for a 2-digit day, 2-digit month, and 4-digit year). This gives us a total of 248 bits, which was sufficient for testing but could be adjusted based on the usage environment. Computationally, the smallest-possible encoding is preferable since the comparison circuit cost increases on a per-bit basis. Now, a 248-bit inequality circuit is built, similar to the 2-bit inequality circuit shown in Figure 3 . The real circuit includes 248 XOR gates to check for equality among the 248 bits and multiple OR gates to coalesce the result. Similarly, circuits are also built to check the remaining match criteria. Finally, the output of the four circuits is coalesced to give a single equality or inequality result. Now, for each record from Party A and each record from Party B, the entire GC will be generated and evaluated. The output of this tells the parties only if the two records match or not. Since every pair of records is independently compared, this process can be completely parallelized.
APPROXIMATE MATCHING TO IMPROVE COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY
To improve the efficiency of the basic GC approach, we designed a simple but efficient approximation strategy that is motivated by the intuition that a record has only one other true match in any other database and that it is unnecessary to compare it against many other records (if they are obviously not going to match). Thus, most of the comparisons between the pairs of records are unsuccessful. While there are ways to speed up comparisons by using other mechanisms, such as stopping the comparison as soon as an inequality is detected, these typically compromise on security since the timing can lead to indications of what is the same or different across the records. Instead, what we want is a fully secure technique that still takes significantly less time than the basic GC strategy.
The key observation is as follows. If two records do not match on any of the four criteria mentioned above, they also will not match in terms of simpler predicates. For example, suppose the match parameters are simply the first and last name. Instead of directly checking these, we check if their length matches for both records and select the matching records as potential candidates. Thus, for example, instead of directly matching "Emily Abbott" with "Barbara Mcklewski," we first check "56" with "79." Since they do not match, there is no need to check the full names. The benefit of this is that the comparison is carried out over much smaller sizes (for example, 2 digits as opposed to over 20 characters).
While there can be spurious matches in the first step (for example, "Emily Abbott" and "Sofia Potter," which both give "66"), they will be likely to be filtered out when we consider other attributes. Even though this incurs a potential risk of introducing false positives (records do not actually match), the approximate comparison can be significantly faster than comparing the raw records in a pairwise manner. It is also possible to create a more complicated circuit that compares the potential matches to output only true matches.
Instead of using ad hoc predicates such as length, the actual implementation uses hashing. First, the records are hashed using a SHA-256 hash. Next, the first few bits of the hash are compared as the preliminary comparison step (a small number of bits corresponds to faster comparison but a higher risk of introducing false positives). Figure 4 illustrates how the entire predicate matching is converted into an approximate comparison based on the hashed values. Note that the use of a good hash function is critical. A good hash function will uniformly distribute all of the records, thus automatically giving us a reduction in potential records to match. For example, if we use only 3 bits of the hash, then the probability of each 3-bit pattern should be 1/8. In general, if s bits of the hash are used, we expect to have approximately 1/2 s of the records matching a particular pattern. Clearly, a larger s is better to filter more records. However, a larger s also results in a more expensive calculation (and a higher memory cost), thus giving us a parameter that can be suitably tuned for optimum performance based on the dataset. While we do not provide bounds on the number of false positives, it may be possible to formally analyze this from a Bloom filter perspective, which we plan to explore in the future. As the experiments show, even using the initial s bits gives very good performance.
Note that the above filtering strategy does not negatively impact security, since the output for every pair of records is still only whether they match or not. When the records do not match, the computation is swift. However, it still does not leak any information regarding what part of the records do not match, etc., due to the use of the one-way hash function.
CONCLUSION
We implemented the proposed algorithms in Java in a two-party distributed setting. The code is completely portable and has been successfully tested on Windows, macOS, and CentOS, with only some variations in performance (running time) due to different Java interpreter implementations. The results below are on Windows 10 with an Intel i7-6820HK 2.7-GHz CPU, 48 Gbytes of memory, and a 1.0-Gbps network adaptor. The synthetic datasets used were generated using the Mockaroo synthetic data generator (available at www.mockaroo.com). The data in each field in these datasets were randomly corrupted (10% to 20%) to emulate basic typographical errors.
Note that the accuracy of the exact-matching algorithm is exactly the same as that reported by Kho et al. 4 Therefore, we compare the loss in accuracy due to the filtering strategy while showing the performance improvement. Figure 5a reports the total running time for several datasets of different sizes. For the cases of 5k × 5k and 10k × 10k, we cannot run the exact matching using one gigantic circuit due to memory limitations and, therefore, estimate the time (i.e., from multiple runs of a single execution of a 500 × 5k and 500 × 10k linkage). Note that the two parties do not need to have the same number of records. The figure clearly demonstrates that the running time of using approximate matching based on the filtering mechanism is significantly faster (time is depicted in log scale). Note that the improvement in computation time is as expected, since smaller input sizes for the comparison circuit automatically lead to a smaller computation time. Indeed, the different hash sizes are somewhat comparable in efficiency, although they all provide more than a tenfold improvement in efficiency over the base method. However, the price paid is in terms of accuracy, since smaller hash sizes lead to more collisions (false positives in terms of the match), as discussed below. Table 1 shows the linkage results. Using the full fields, the same results are achieved as the underlying matching algorithm. Approximate matching is much faster but can introduce false positives (FPs). It is clear that all of the algorithms obtain accurate results for the two smallest datasets. This is due to the fact that no hash collisions occur even for smaller hash sizes. However, for larger datasets, shorter hashes will result in more collisions, thus leading to more FPs. For example, for 10K × 10K, the 24-bit hash input results in 26 FP cases beyond the baseline. If we increase the hash inputs just 4 bits to 28 bits, only 1 additional FP arises. With 36-bit hashes, there are no additional FPs beyond the underlying method. Figure 5b shows the maximum memory cost (MMC) of approximate matching. As expected, the MMC grows when the size of patient linkages increases. However, for the same linkage size, increasing the hash bit length does not increase the MMC significantly.
Furthermore, it can be seen that the base method (without the use of hashing) requires significantly larger memory. Indeed, for the two largest cases (5K × 5K and 10K × 10K), 48 Gbytes was insufficient. Therefore, in order to get the running time, we had to carry out the experiment over partitions of the data instead of the entire dataset all at once. For the memory usage, we have estimated the exact memory that would be required if the entire dataset were to be used in a single pass. Again, this demonstrates the viability of hash-based filtering, since the memory usage is the primary constraint in carrying out such computation for larger dataset sizes.
To conclude, using GC provides perfect security and, when coupled with approximate matching, can be reasonably efficient, though restricted to only two parties. In fact, multiparty matching can be implemented using a pairwise strategy, where comparisons are done in parallel using a binary tree, which will result in an additional log-scale factor for complexity. However, we leave the analysis of this to future work.
In addition, the computational complexity of the GC framework is much higher than that of the insecure plaintext method. For our laptop with 4 cores and 48 Gbytes of memory, to guarantee at least 80-bit security, the size 10K × 10K with a 36-bit hash requires almost 3 hours. Bigger data sizes require more memory or powerful workstations. Alternatively, a secure hardware-based method such as Intel's SGX (Software Guard Extensions; https://software.intel.com/en-us/isaextensions/intel-sgx) can also be leveraged, which we plan to explore in the future. 
